{"id":220231,"date":"2026-08-23T16:52:16","date_gmt":"2026-08-23T23:52:16","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/portal.bluetogold.com\/?p=220231"},"modified":"2026-09-17T07:12:28","modified_gmt":"2026-09-17T14:12:28","slug":"constitutional-considerations-of-warrantless-surround-and-call-outs","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/portal.bluetogold.com\/?p=220231","title":{"rendered":"Constitutional Considerations of Warrantless \u201cSurround and Call-Outs\u201d"},"content":{"rendered":"

Absent Exigency, Constructive (Coercive) Home Entries Violate Payton<\/em>\u2019s Warrant Requirement<\/strong><\/h1>\n

Overview<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Under Payton v. New York<\/em>, a warrant is required to arrest a defendant in his home, absent narrow exceptions such as exigent circumstances. Courts have analyzed the constitutionality of warrantless \u201csurround and callouts\u201d where police command, instruct, or demand a suspect exit his home, to effectuate his arrest. Courts have held that Payton<\/em>\u2019s warrant requirement extends to both actual (physical) and constructive or coercive (de facto) home entries. Describing the latter, the Tenth Circuit in Maez <\/em>held: \u201cPayton<\/em> is violated where there is such a show of force that a defendant comes out of a home under coercion and submits to being taken in custody.\u201d The Second Circuit in Allen<\/em> reiterated: Where \u201cofficers engage in actions to coerce the occupant outside of the home, they . . . achieve the same effect as an actual entry, and therefore trigger Payton’s <\/em>protections.\u201d<\/p>\n

Absent a Warrant or Exigent Circumstances, Commanding Occupants to Come Outside Violates the \u201cSanctity of the Home\u201d Central to the Fourth Amendment<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In Allen<\/em>, the Second Circuit explained that \u201callowing the police to arrest a subject in his home, even without first entering the home, [by coercing him to come out] would undermine the barrier against government intrusions into the home that the warrant requirement attempts to erect.\u201d Thus, \u201claw enforcement may not<\/em> cause a suspect to open the door of the home to effect a warrantless arrest\u201d without exigent circumstances. Even a \u201csimple command to the occupant to submit to arrest\u201d is \u201ca sufficient exercise of authority\u201d to effectuate a seizure, whether or not a \u201cthreat of force\u201d is shown. \u201cSuch a command projects the authority of the police into the home, and requires a warrant under Payton<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

Courts Have Held that Warrantless Arrests Expand Beyond the Scope of the Implied Social License (Girl Scout Rule), Requiring Justification under a Different Exception<\/strong><\/h2>\n

The justification behind the Girl Scout Rule is that police may engage in the same conduct permitted by civilians. French v. Merrill <\/em>(First Circuit 2021). Compelling residents to exit a home, relying on the official authority uniquely held by law enforcement, expands beyond this scope. While \u201cofficers, like any other citizens, have an implied license to approach a home, knock on the door, and try to speak with the occupants,\u201d the scope \u201cis limited . . . to a specific purpose,\u201d which \u201cdoes not<\/em> include conducting a . . . warrantless arrest.\u201d Allen<\/em> (Second Circuit 2016).<\/p>\n

Courts Have Held that Terry<\/em>\u2019s Rules for Investigative Stops Do Not <\/em>Apply to Warrantless In-Home Seizures, Which Require Both Probable Cause and Exigent Circumstances<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Describing a \u201csurround and call-out\u201d as an investigative detention (rather than an arrest), will not<\/em> enable an in-home warrantless seizure to pass constitutional muster, absent exigent circumstances. In Lujano<\/em>, the California Court of Appeals (Fourth District) emphasized: \u201c[T]o fall within the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, an arrest or detention within a home or dwelling must be supported by both probable cause<\/a> and . . . exigent circumstances,\u201d not <\/em>merely reasonable suspicion. In Perez<\/em>, the California Court of Appeals (Fourth District) recently affirmed that Terry<\/em>\u2019s \u201cexception to the warrant requirement for investigative detentions for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity, does not<\/em> apply to in-home searches and seizures.\u201d<\/p>\n

Likewise, the Sixth Circuit in Morgan<\/em> reiterated that \u201clabeling the police conduct [compelling a home occupant to open the door] as an investigatory stop does not preclude constitutional scrutiny,\u201d although such a \u201cshow of force and authority\u201d typically constitutes an arrest. In Storey v. Taylor<\/em>, the Tenth Circuit stated: \u201cTo enter a home and seize an individual for a routine investigatory purpose, police must have exigent circumstances and probable cause, or a warrant, \u2018no matter whether the seizure is an investigatory stop or an arrest.\u2019\u201d Thus, \u201clabeling an encounter in the home as either an investigatory stop or an arrest is meaningless because Payton<\/em>‘s requirements apply to all seizures . . . of persons inside their homes.\u201d This includes where the seizure is created by \u201ca sufficiently coercive order requiring an individual to leave his own house.\u201d<\/p>\n

Sample of Federal Appellate Cases<\/u> Holding that the Warrantless \u201cSurround and Call-Out\u201d (Coercive Demand that an Occupant Exit His Home) Violated the Fourth Amendment<\/strong><\/h2>\n

French v. Merrill<\/em><\/strong> (First Circuit 2021): \u201c[I]n the early morning, [police] entered the curtilage<\/a> of French\u2019s home, repeatedly knocked on his front door and bedroom window, shouted his name, and urged him to answer the door, all without a warrant and in an attempt to investigate whether he had committed a crime.\u201d This \u201cexceeded the limited scope of the customary social license [Girl Scout Rule that allows officers] to \u2018approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.\u2019\u201d The Court held that this \u201cwarrantless and unlicensed physical intrusion on the property\u201d ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment, in violation of clearly established law, resulting in the loss of qualified immunity<\/a>.<\/p>\n

United States v. Allen<\/em><\/strong> (Second Circuit 2016): The warrantless \u201carrest violated Payton<\/em> where officers knocked on defendant’s door and told him \u2018he would need to come down to the police station to be processed.\u2019\u201d After the defendant opened his apartment door, police \u201cthen told [him] that he would need to come down to the police station to be processed for [an] assault. In other words, he was under arrest.\u201d The Court explained that \u201claw enforcement may not cause a suspect to open the door of the home to effect a warrantless arrest of a suspect in his home in the absence of exigent circumstances.\u201d If \u201cofficers summon a suspect to the door of his home and place him under arrest, . . . in the absence of exigent circumstances, Payton <\/em>is violated regardless of whether the officers physically cross the threshold. That rule applies regardless of whether the police \u2018constructively\u2019 or \u2018coercively\u2019 entered . . . through shows of force or authority.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Mowatt<\/em><\/strong> (Fourth Circuit 2008): The Fourth Amendment was violated where police \u201cbegan pounding on the [apartment] door,\u201d and \u201c[i]n response to the officers’ repeated demands, [the resident] finally opened the door.\u201d The Court held that \u201cthe officers’ entry into the room had been \u2018demanded under color of office\u2019 and was therefore not by the defendant’s consent.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Saari<\/em><\/strong> (Sixth Circuit 2001): The \u201cdefendant’s warrantless arrest \u2018was accomplished while he was in his home\u2019 and thus violated Payton<\/em> where \u2018officers surrounded the house, flooded it with spotlights and summoned [him] with a bullhorn.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Morgan<\/em><\/strong> (Sixth Circuit 1984): \u201cNine police officers and several patrol cars approached and surrounded the [defendant\u2019s] residence in the dark. The officer . . . strategically positioned his car in the driveway . . . blocking any movement of his car. The police then called for [him] to come out of the house. These circumstances surely amount to a show of official authority such that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Jerez<\/em><\/strong> (Seventh Circuit 1997): Deputies \u201cknock[ed] on the door of a quiet motel room for three minutes,\u201d and \u201ccommanded, \u2018Police. Open up the door.\u2019\u201d A deputy also \u201cknocked on the room’s only window for one-and-a-half to two minutes\u201d and \u201cshone his flashlight through the small opening in the window’s drapes, illuminating [the defendant] as he lay in the bed.\u201d The Court held: \u201cWhen [the occupant] finally opened the door to his motel room in his underwear, he was submitting to the deputies’ show of authority . . . The officers’ persistence destroyed any possibility that the occupants could return to sleep and ignore the[m] . . . A reasonable person . . . could conclude only that the deputies would not leave unless the door was opened.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Conner<\/em><\/strong> (Eighth Circuit 1997): Following an anonymous tip on the whereabouts of burglary suspects, police identified a vehicle of interest in a motel parking lot. Officers knocked and shouted: \u201c\u2018Open up,\u2019 in a voice loud enough to be heard by a motel resident two rooms away.\u201d The occupants opened the door, and with what appeared to be the stolen property in plain view, were arrested. \u201c[U]nder the totality of circumstances, [the defendant] did not<\/em> voluntarily consent to the officers’ entry into the motel room. Thus, the police officers’ action constituted an unconstitutional intrusion into that zone of privacy.\u201d Affirming that motel residents hold the same privacy interests as in the home, the Court held: \u201c[A]n unconstitutional search occurs when officers gain visual or physical access to a motel room after an occupant opens the door . . . in response to a demand under color of [police] authority.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Nora<\/em><\/strong> (Ninth Circuit 2014): \u201cAlthough officers physically took Nora into custody outside his home in the front yard, they accomplished that feat only by surrounding his house and ordering him to come out at gunpoint . . . forcing a suspect to exit his home in those circumstances constitutes an in-home arrest under Payton<\/em>.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Gooch<\/em><\/strong> (Ninth Circuit 1993): The Fourth Amendment was violated where \u201cofficers, without seeking an arrest warrant, ordered Gooch out of the tent, patted him down, and arrested him\u201d at a state campground. The Court of Appeals affirmed the \u201cjudgment of acquittal and the subsequent order of dismissal with prejudice of defendant[\u2019s] . . . conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm.\u201d[16]<\/a><\/p>\n

United States v. Maez<\/em><\/strong> (Tenth Circuit 1989): \u201cGiven the presence of some ten officers, the drawn weapons of the SWAT team surrounding the [defendant\u2019s] trailer, the use of the loudspeakers, and the frightening circumstances\u201d created, \u201ca reasonable person would have believed he had to come out of the home and submit to the show of authority. Accordingly, . . . [the defendant] was arrested while in his home,\u201d in violation of the Fourth Amendment.<\/p>\n

United States v. Reeves<\/em><\/strong> (Tenth Circuit 2008): \u201cAlthough there is no evidence the officers gave [the hotel room occupant] a direct order to open his door, the officers’ actions were effectively a command to open the door,\u201d where they \u201cpounded on [the] door and window while yelling and loudly identifying themselves . . . for at least twenty minutes.\u201d The \u201cencounter began between 2:30 and 3:00 in the morning, a time which must be taken into consideration when analyzing the coerciveness . . . A reasonable person faced with several police officers consistently knocking and yelling at their door for twenty minutes in the early morning hours would not feel free to ignore the officers’ implicit command to open the door.\u201d Moreover, \u201cno exigent circumstances existed to provide an exception to the warrant requirement;\u201d thus the arrest of the defendant, a known felon and aggravated assault suspect, was held unlawful.<\/p>\n

Storey v. Taylor<\/em><\/strong> (Tenth Circuit 2012): Officers responded to an anonymous \u201creport of a loud domestic argument.\u201d When police arrived at the home, Mr. Storey was alone and no arguing could be heard; he admitted having argued with his wife. An officer ordered Mr. Storey out of the home, stating: \u201cYou shall obey my command and step outside the house or you go to jail.\u201d The Court explained: \u201cAbsent exigent circumstances, [police] had no basis on which to order Storey out of his house.\u201d Even if \u201cconstrued as an investigatory detention rather than a full arrest, that distinction does not matter in an individual’s own home; the \u2018sanctity of the home\u2019 lies \u2018at the very core of the Fourth Amendment\u2019 and cannot reasonably be disturbed absent exigent circumstances.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Edmondson<\/em><\/strong>, (Eleventh Circuit 1986): \u201cWith weapons drawn, and with the . . . front of the apartment surrounded, the agents knocked on the door . . . yell[ing] \u2018FBI. Open the door.\u2019 [The defendant] opened the door, stepped back, and placed his hands upon his head.\u201d This constituted an unlawful warrantless arrest, because the \u201cconsent to the entry into his residence [was] prompted by a show of official authority.\u201d<\/p>\n

United States v. Tovar-Rico<\/em><\/strong> (Eleventh Circuit 1998): With firearms drawn, \u201cat least five officers knocked loudly, . . . announced their identity as police officers through the closed door, and requested permission to enter. Defendant then opened the door.\u201d The Court held: \u201cTovar opened the door in response to a \u2018show of official authority\u2019 and cannot be deemed to have consented.\u201d<\/p>\n

Sample of State Appellate Cases<\/u> Holding that the Warrantless \u201cSurround and Call-Out\u201d (Coercive Demand that an Occupant Exit His Home) Violated the Fourth Amendment<\/strong><\/h2>\n

California Court of Appeals<\/strong><\/h3>\n

People v. Perez <\/em><\/strong>(Cal. Fourth District, Third Div. 2026): Following tips from 911 calls regarding an armed suspicious person, a subject matching the description was observed entering an apartment. Approaching the front door with firearms drawn, police ordered him several times to come outside, where he was arrested. The Court determined: \u201cPerez was [illegally] seized while still inside the residence, when he submitted to the officer’s authority and complied with their orders, supported by drawn guns, to come out.\u201d Thus, the defendant was permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, and \u201chis in-field identification, his statements during his initial seizure, and all items seized on his person\u201d were suppressed.<\/p>\n

Florida Court of Appeal<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Davis v. State<\/em><\/strong> (Fla. Second District 1999): When police arrived at a burglary suspect\u2019s house, her boyfriend had just stepped outside. Police observed the female through the open front door, showed \u201chis badge and gun and asked her and the man to step outside and place their hands on a car.\u201d The Court explained that \u201cwhether [police] had \u2018asked\u2019 [her] to leave her home, or \u2018instructed\u2019 her to do so . . . is irrelevant.\u201d Police \u201cshowed [the defendant] his badge and gun and instructed her to place her hands on a car. This show of authority resulted in a seizure . . . law enforcement cannot avoid the dictates of Payton<\/em> . . . by ordering suspects out of their homes, then arresting or detaining them as if they had been encountered \u2018abroad.\u2019\u201d<\/p>\n

Nevada Supreme Court<\/strong><\/h3>\n

Walters v. State<\/em><\/strong> (Nev. 1990): While circling the defendant\u2019s home with a helicopter, officers used a bullhorn to order him to leave his house, and he indeed emerged. \u201cUnder these circumstances . . . a reasonable person would [not] feel free to ignore the police and remain in his home. Therefore, [the defendant] did not<\/em> voluntarily turn himself in . . . he only emerged from his home under circumstances of coercion.\u201d Thus, for purposes of Payton<\/em>, \u201cthe arrest occurred while he was still within his home.\u201d The Court suppressed the defendant\u2019s Mirandized statements made while being transported in a police car, as the fruit of an unlawful arrest. The Court held that \u201ca reversal [of a second-degree murder conviction] and retrial are required as a result of the admission of [the defendant\u2019s] inculpatory statement resulting from an unlawful arrest.\u201d<\/p>\n

Court of Appeals of New York<\/strong><\/h3>\n

People v. Shaw<\/em><\/strong> (N.Y. App. 2026): After observing a homicide suspect through an apartment window, police \u201cshouted at him to \u2018come on out, [the] house is surrounded . . . come out empty handed and come out with your hands up.\u2019\u201d Indeed, the \u201cbuilding was surrounded by more than a dozen . . . officers dressed in tactical gear and . . . an armored SWAT vehicle on the premises.\u201d The Court concluded: \u201cIn the face of this overwhelming show of authority by police, no reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the officer’s command to exit the home.\u201d<\/p>\n

Oregon Supreme Court<\/strong><\/h3>\n

State v. Dahl<\/em> (Or. 1996): Police responded to an anonymous report of a \u201cman waving a gun on the front porch at a specified address. The officers arrived at that location, barricaded the streets, and surrounded the house.\u201d Upon seeing \u201cdefendant come out of the house onto the front porch, [an officer] shouted for him to come down \u2018with his hands up.\u2019 Instead, defendant went back into the house and shut the door. At [the officer\u2019s] request, a police dispatcher then telephoned defendant and ordered him to come out of the house with his hands up.\u201d The Court determined: \u201cThe police order to defendant was not a request. Rather, it conveyed a message that compliance was required . . . The encounter . . . cannot fairly be characterized as voluntary or consensual; rather, it was confrontational and coercive . . . depriv[ing] defendant of any choice.\u201d The Court held that \u201cthere were no exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless seizure of defendant inside his house.\u201d The Court concluded: \u201cPermitting the police, without a warrant based on probable cause or probable cause plus exigent circumstances, to seize a person inside his house by ordering that person to emerge from his house would be inconsistent with . . . well-established constitutional principle[s].\u201d<\/p>\n

Conclusion: <\/strong>Coercive (Constructive) Entries, Concrete Consequences<\/h2>\n

In Reeves<\/em>, the Tenth Circuit recounted: \u201cPayton<\/em> held \u2018the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.\u2019 That line can<\/em> be breached by conduct other than physical entry, . . . where there is such a show of force that a defendant comes out of a home under coercion and submits to being taken in custody.\u201d Due to the inherent power held by those duly sworn to enforce the law, courts have held that a simple command made by police can meet this bar: \u201cOpening the door to one’s home is not voluntary if ordered to do so under color of authority.\u201d<\/p>\n

Under the exclusionary rule, courts have suppressed physical evidence, Mirandized statements, and witness identifications resulting from warrantless arrests of subjects coerced out of their home. Clearly established law has been held violated and qualified immunity lost, where police entered curtilage, knocked repeatedly on the door, and yelled for residents to come out. This conduct creates an in-home seizure, requiring either a warrant or exigent circumstances supported by probable cause.<\/p>\n

References<\/strong><\/h2>\n
    \n
  1. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 588 (1980) (\u201c[T]he Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  2. <\/a>\u201cThe surround and call out tactic consists of just what it says: [officers] deploy around the [suspect\u2019s] location, announce their presence, and demand that those inside come outside.\u201d David Klinger & Jeff Rojek, Multi-Method Study of Special Weapons and Tactics Teams<\/em>, Nat. Inst. Justice 73 (2008).<\/li>\n
  3. <\/a>\u201cA person’s home can be invaded to the same extent when the police remain outside the house and call a person to the door as when the police physically enter the household itself.\u201d State v. Holeman, 103 Wash. 2d 426, 429 (1985).<\/li>\n
  4. <\/a>Payton<\/em>\u2019s protections \u201care primarily triggered by\u201d the arrestee\u2019s (not<\/em> the officer\u2019s) location. United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76, 78, 81 (2016).<\/li>\n
  5. <\/a>Although police, \u201clike any other citizens, have an implied license to approach a home, knock on the door, and try to speak with the occupants,\u201d its limited scope \u201cdoes not<\/em> include . . . warrantless arrest[s].\u201d Allen<\/em>, 813 F.3d at 85.<\/li>\n
  6. \u201cThe same proscription limiting warrantless arrests in the home has been extended to detentions that fall short of formal arrests.\u201d People v. Lujano, 229 Cal.App.4th 175, 182, 188 (4th DCA, 2d Div. 2014) (The \u201cevidence seized . . . from defendant’s person and . . . home was the fruit of an unlawful detention,\u201d where police \u201cordered anyone inside to come out.\u201d). \u201c[T]he usual rules pertaining to Terry<\/em> stops do not<\/em> apply in homes.\u201d People v. Perez, 119 Cal.App.5th 373, 378 (4th DCA, 3d Div. 2026).<\/li>\n
  7. <\/a>\u201cAlthough the order to \u2018step out of the house\u2019 could be construed as an investigatory detention rather than a full arrest, that distinction does not matter\u201d because \u201cthe \u2018sanctity of the home\u2019 . . . cannot reasonably be disturbed absent exigent circumstances.\u201d Storey v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 987, 994 (10th Cir. 2012). \u201cPayton<\/em>\u2019s protections apply to all Fourth Amendment seizures of persons inside their home.\u201d United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 2008).<\/li>\n
  8. <\/a>French v. Merrill, 15 F.4th 116 (1st Cir. 2021) (The Fourth Amendment was violated when \u201c[o]fficers reentered the property [curtilage] four times and took aggressive actions\u201d including \u201ccontinuing to knock on [the] front door\u201d and \u201cbedroom window frame, [while] yelling for [the resident] to come out of his home.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  9. <\/a>United States v. Allen, 813 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (A \u201csimple command to the occupant to submit to arrest\u201d is \u201ca sufficient exercise of authority\u201d to effectuate a seizure, whether or not a \u201cloud and clear threat of force\u201d is shown. \u201cSuch a command projects the authority of the police into the home, and requires a warrant under Payton<\/em>.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  10. <\/a>United States v. Mowatt, 513 F.3d 395 (4th Cir. 2008) (The Fourth Amendment was violated where \u201cofficers continued to insist that [the resident] let them into the apartment\u201d absent a warrant or exigent circumstances).<\/li>\n
  11. <\/a>United States v. Saari, 272 F3d 804 (6th Cir. 2001) (A seizure occurred where \u201cofficers positioned themselves in front of the only exit from Defendant’s apartment with their guns drawn. They knocked forcefully on the door and announced that they were the police. Upon opening the door, Defendant was instructed to come outside, which he did. Under these circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  12. <\/a>United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1984) (\u201cAlthough there was no direct police entry into the [defendant\u2019s] home prior to [his] arrest, the constructive entry accomplished the same thing, namely, the arrest of Morgan. Thus, the warrantless arrest of [the [defendant], as he stood within the door of a private home, after emerging in response to coercive police conduct, violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  13. <\/a>United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1997) (\u201c[T]he totality of the circumstances\u201d including \u201cthe late hour, . . . the three minutes of knocking on the door, the commands and requests to open the door, the one-and-a-half to two minutes of knocking on the outside window, and the shining of the flashlight through the small opening in the window’s drapes onto the face of [the occupant] as he lay in bed, makes clear that a seizure took place.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  14. <\/a>United States v. Conner, 127 F.3d 663 (8th Cir. 1997) (\u201c[I]f the police could demand entry into a person’s home or hotel room to investigate suspected criminal activity in situations where they lack a warrant or even probable cause to search or arrest, the Fourth Amendment rule would be swallowed by the Terry<\/em> exception.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  15. <\/a>United States v. Nora, No. 12-50485 (9th Cir. 2014) (\u201c[T]he arrest violated Payton<\/em> . . . and violated the Fourth Amendment, where the officers physically took the defendant into custody outside his home in the front yard only by surrounding his house and ordering him to come out at gunpoint, and no exigency existed.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  16. <\/a>United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that ordering Gooch out of his tent to conduct his warrantless arrest violated the Fourth Amendment where there were no exigent circumstances).<\/li>\n
  17. <\/a>United States v. Maez, 872 F. 2d 1444 (10th Cir. 1989) (A Fourth Amendment \u201cviolation and unlawful arrest occurred\u201d where \u201cofficers, FBI agents and a SWAT team surrounded the [defendant\u2019s] trailer, and with guns pointed at the home, asked him and his family to come out. They did and [he] was taken into custody.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  18. <\/a>United States v. Reeves, 524 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2008) (\u201c[W]hen Reeves answered his door he did so in response to a show of authority . . . and he was seized . . . inside his [hotel] room without a warrant in violation of Payton<\/em>.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  19. <\/a>Storey v. Taylor, 696 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that qualified immunity was lost where \u201cit was also clear that exigent circumstances were required\u201d to warrantlessly order an occupant out of his home).<\/li>\n
  20. <\/a>United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512 (11th Cir. 1986) (\u201cA suspect does not consent to being arrested within his residence when his consent . . . is prompted by a show of official [police] authority.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  21. <\/a>People v. Perez, 119 Cal.App.5th 373 (Cal. 4th DCA, 3rd Div. 2026) (\u201c[A]n in-home arrest requires a warrant, even if the officers remain outside.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  22. <\/a>Davis v. State, 744 So.2d 586 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (Observing a burglary suspect through an open front door, police \u201cshowed [her] his badge and gun and asked her . . . to step outside . . . This show of authority resulted in a seizure.\u201d Police \u201ccannot avoid the dictates of Payton<\/em> . . . by ordering suspects out of their homes, then arresting or detaining them as if they had been encountered \u2018abroad.\u201d); see also <\/em>Findley v. State, 771 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). \u201c[A] person is seized if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would conclude that he or she is not free to end the encounter and depart. Whether characterized as a request or an order, the officer\u2019s \u201cdirection . . . constituted a show of authority which restrained [the defendant\u2019s] freedom of movement because a reasonable person under the circumstances would believe that he should comply.\u201d Popple v. State, 626 So.2d 185, 188 (Fla. 1993).<\/li>\n
  23. <\/a>Walters v. State, 786 P.2d 1202 (Nev. 1990) (Where \u201cpolice had a helicopter circling the house from which commands to exit the house were communicated by means of a bullhorn,\u201d the defendant\u2019s Mirandized statements, made while subsequently being transported in a police car, were suppressed as fruit of an unlawful arrest).<\/li>\n
  24. <\/a>\u201cBecause the arrest was not executed lawfully, Walters’ statement to the police while riding [in the police car] should not<\/em> have been admitted.\u201d Walters<\/em>, 786 P.2d at 1203 (followed by Edwards v. State, 808 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1991)).<\/li>\n
  25. <\/a>People v. Shaw, NY Slip Op. 961 (N.Y. App. 2026) (Consensual \u201c\u2018knock and talk\u2019 encounters are distinct from the use of coercive tactics to force a defendant out of the home.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  26. <\/a>State v. Dahl, 915 P.2d 979 (Or. 1996) (By ordering Dahl out of his house, \u201cpolice engaged in conduct significantly beyond that accepted in ordinary social intercourse.\u201d His \u201csubmission to such a show of force and assertion of authority significantly restricted, interfered with, or otherwise deprived him of his liberty or freedom,\u201d constituting a seizure.).<\/li>\n
  27. <\/a>Because the defendant\u2019s \u201cinculpatory statement [made in a police car after being Mirandized] was the product of an illegal arrest, the statement should have been suppressed.\u201d Walters v. State, 786 P.2d 1202, 1203 (Nev. 1990).<\/li>\n
  28. <\/a>Perez<\/em>, 119 Cal.App.5th at 379 (granting the defendant\u2019s \u201csuppression motion . . . to exclude his in-field identification, his statements during his initial seizure, and all items seized on his person.\u201d).<\/li>\n
  29. <\/a>French<\/em>, 15 F.4th at 130-33 (\u201c[O]fficers violated clearly established law and are not<\/em> entitled to qualified immunity,\u201d where they \u201cforcefully knock[ed] on the front door and a bedroom window frame, and urge[d] the residents to come out.\u201d); Storey<\/em>, 696 F.3d at 995 (holding that \u201cthe plaintiff was unlawfully seized when he complied with the order to exit his house . . . the law on this point was clearly established, making qualified immunity inapplicable.\u201d).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Related from Blue to Gold<\/h2>\n